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INTRODUCTION 
The design of effective systems for cooperative work must be 
based on a thorough understanding of the forces that shape 
cooperation and influence the productivity of the work group. We 
argue that cooperative work is not a straightforward social 
process whose stability can be taken for granted. On the 
contrary, each case of work group formation and process is 
uniquely influenced by its contextual forces. The appropriate 
type of information technology for the work group, and the impact 
of the technology on work group performance, are also determined 
in part by that context. 
The objective of this paper is to investigate the organizational 
context of cooperative work. We have chosen a particular model 
of organizations, the transaction costs model, to characterize : 
broad classes of economic and organizational contexts for 
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cooperative work. We then describe several cases of information 
technology used for work group coordination, as examples of 
application of the transaction cost model. Finally we suggest 
implications for the design of information and communication 
systems which may support or alter different types of cooperative 
work groups. 
In the remainder of the paper, we will use the terms llteamworkw 
and "work groupw rather than "cooperative workw or 
wcollaborationw. We are conscious of the ongoing debate 
surrounding choice of terminology to define this emerging field. 
We make no assumptions about llcooperationg~ in a team; it will be 
seen that cooperation is a defining characteristic of certain 
types of teams. We assume a team involves multiple people 
working toward at least one shared goal. (There may be other 
conflicting goals of individual team members.) 
THE NATURE OF TEAPIWORK IN ORGANIZATIONS 
Why is teamwork important? From an economic standpoint, teamwork 
is justified because the collective output of a team is greater 
than the sum of the outputs of each member taken separately 
(~lchian & Demsetz, 1972). 
Teamwork takes place in a variety of settings: a clerical 
operation of a bank, a research and development laboratory, a 
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i $ 
university faculty, a workerst cooperative. Each setting is b 
characterized by a social tlforce fieldt* (Lewin, 1941). Examples $ 
! 
I 
of force fields in the organizational context of a work team are: % 
t* 
the hierarchical authority system, formal communications 
\ 
channels, the reward system, peer pressures, competitive forces, ,' 
etc.* The life of the team and nature of group process are i 
, 
conditioned by these forces and the reactions of individual work 
group members to them. Thus even if members are willing to be 
fully cooperative, external and internal pressures may push them 
beyond the limits they perceive to be fair and equitable for 
their participation. Individuals may react differently. Some 
may withdraw or reduce their efforts temporarily, while others 
may withdraw from the team permanently. Some may continue to 
participate under stress, with the quality of their contribution 
having deteriorated. Others may hide their dissatisfaction and 
simply shirk responsibilities. 
The communication structure of the group, the key element of 
coordination of activity, must be able to elicit and signal 
problems so that the team can respond adequately before teamwork 
collapses. Specifically, the communication structure can improve 
the sharing of information, thus increasing the transparency of 
individual efforts (Marschak & Radner, 1973). It can signal the 
*To be sure, psychological forces are also at work in team 
formation and process. In this article we take a perspective 
that looks only at the structural-economic forces. This limits 
the scope of our analysis to the "structural architecturew of L 
teams. , 
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beginning and completion of tasks to all group members. It can 
support the renegotiation of the terms of explicit or implicit 
contracts that link team members. It can uncover shirking of 
responsibilities. It can filter out false information used for 
coverups. It can provide a forum for discussing and exploring 
the limits of cooperation. It can make the team more open to 
external incentives and signals such as competitive pressure. On 
the other hand, it can buffer the team from external pressures 
regarded as potentially disruptive to group performance. 
The communication structure described above is not necessarily 
electronic. The physical proximity of team members and 
availability of channels determine the medium: face-to-face, 
telephone, memo, electronic mail, etc. However, introducing a 
more advanced system to support work group coordination can have 
a significant influence in at least two ways. First, it can 
impact the contents of the messages exchanged. For instance, it 
might transform the format of a message or enrich its 
comprehensibility. Second, the system can impact the nature of 
group process and group organization: the reciprocal contractual 
arrangements of group members, methods for solving interpersonal 
conflicts, etc. 
In the remainder of this paper, we concentrate on the effect of 
communication structures on the latter, group process and 
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structure, using as a framework for analysis transaction cost 
theory (Williamson,l975; ~iborra~l987). 
TEAMWORK STRUCTURES: A TRANSACTION COSTS VIEW 
The transaction cost model of economic organizations is one of 
several models of organizations as information processors which 
can help us understand the organizational context of work groups 
and the role of information technology in work group support. 
~pecifically, transaction costs are the costs of setting up, 
enforcing, and maintaining the reciprocal obligations, or 
contracts, that keep the members of a team together. These 
contracts can be set by a central coordinator or authority, or 
they can be the result of ongoing negotiations directly between 
group members. Transaction costs represent the ttoverheadtt of the 
team and they are linked to the resources (time, skills, etc.) 
employed to allow a work team to produce more than the sum of its 
parts. 
The goal of information technology is to reduce transaction costs 
through improving information handling and communication. This 
may be accomplished by reducing the amount of information 
required in a transaction (e.g., through standard procedures or 
programmed decisions) or, alternatively, by adding value to the 
information communicated (e.g., through effective utilization of 
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distribution channels). In the next section we will discuss the 
role of information technology in more detail. 
* 
There are two main factors in the organizational context that 
influence work group process and structure: task uncertainty and , 
goal congruence among group members. Task uncertainty varies in 
that the more uncertain the task, the greater the amount of 
information required to be processed by team members for , 
coordination purposes (Galbraith,1977). Sources of task 
uncertainty may be internal to the group (e.g., lack of ! 
experience with a new manufacturing technology) or external 
(e.g., market turbulence). 
Goal congruence among members may be thought of as trust. Low 
levels of trust increase the risk that individual members will 
shirk their responsibilities or exploit opportunities for 
individual gain at the expense of the group. As a consequence, 
more resources are required for monitoring performance in order 
to ensure group members1 confidence in fair treatment. With a 
high level of goal congruence, a work group can be relatively 
self-reliant and self-motivated and require little external 
monitoring.; a group of this sort can be considered 
"cooperative". Transaction cost theory indicates the most 
efficient ( e . ,  with lowest overhead) organization of a given , 
team in its organizational context, characterized by competitive 
forces and the degree of both task uncertainty and goal t 
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congruence (see Figure 1). Three different stereotypical 
organizational structures and contexts for team work can be 
1. Market-like: When task uncertainty and goal congruence are 
low, the market is the most straightforward arrangement for 
team organization: arm's-length spot contracts are 
sufficient to coordinate and control the activities of group 
members; rewards are allocated according to current prices 
for service delivered. Competition takes care of shirking 
and opportunistic behavior. The role of a market structure 
as an effective coordination and control mechanism in 
general requires a large number of participants exchanging 
standardized services. When this model is applied to 
individuals supplying products and services, the rules of 
cooperation are set by market forces, i.e, price. 
Requirements for coordination among individuals are low and 
thus overhead costs are low. The individuals supplying 
products or services are not a tfteamft in the normal sense 
because they compete on the basis or price rather than work 
together to accomplish a common objective. 
2. Clan: If task uncertainty is high, the most efficient work 
group arrangement is one based on high levels of trust; a 
clan reinforces the sharing of values and goals that 
facilitate joint problem solving in complex, ambiguous 
situations. Flexibility in the face of new, uncertain 
events is facilitated if members are able to rule out at the 
outset costly haggling and suspicion of cheating from their 
mutual dealings. The overhead costs of setting up and 
maintaining a clan are high, but they may be necessary due 
to high task uncertainty. 
3. Hierarchy: These arrangements are best suited when shirking 
cannot be completely ruled out a priori, i.e., the level of 
trust is intermediate, and task uncertainty is neither high 
enough to require an inordinate amount of exception 
handling, nor so low that a market mechanism to handle 
coordination is more efficient. Consequently, the overhead 
costs of maintaining a hierarchy are intermediate. 
Transaction cost theory provides a contingency view of efficient 
team arrangements, but does not exclude the possibility 
arrangements that do not match a particular combination of task 
uncertainty and goal congruence. organization does not 
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match these conditions, the theory of transaction costs predicts 
that an extra amount of resources (overhead) will be required in 
order to buffer a team from external competitive forces and keep 
it viable the way it is. 
Thus, for example, a hierarchical arrangement may exist where a 
clan would be more efficient; in this case, the hierarchy will 
be bogged down by exception reporting and handling activities, 
and group members (who have high goal congruence) will have to 
put up with unnecessarily formal and rigid procedures. At the 
other extreme, in an environment with low goal congruence, the 
requirements of a clan-like organization will be costlier in 
terms of slower decision making. 
EFFECTS OF INTRODUCTION OF WORK GROUP SUPPORT SYSTEMS 
If an information system purportedly designed to support work 
group coordination is introduced into a team, what happens? The 
transaction cost model suggests a contingency view: it depends 
on whether there is a good fit between the two factors and team 
structure prior to introduction of the new system. A system, if 
J 
it responds to the needs of the work group, will facilitate P 
changes by acting on the fundamental transaction costs 
themselves. 
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There are multiple possible design goals, either explicit or 
i 
implicit, that might be pursued in the introduction of a system + 
to support a team, all resulting in some reduction in transaction i 
costs: 
* To standardize tasks, thus reducing task uncertainty; 
* TO standardize interfaces between execution of subtasks, 
thus streamlining coordination; 
* TO facilitate reporting, monitoring, etc. of performance, 
thus reducing shirking; 
* To encourage communication through creation of new channels 
or improvement of existing ones, thus reducing hierarchical 
barriers and allowing new ideas to flow more easily (Sproull 
& Kiesler, 1986). 
A system may be explicitly introduced to decrease transaction 
costs and thus facilitate a particular organization structure. 
For example, communication channels might be improved to 
reinforce a clan-like structure. Project management tools might 
reduce task uncertainty, thus helping the organization operate 
< 
more efficiently as a hierarchy or even move closer to a market- + 
like structure (Dhar & Olson, 1987). 
Another alternative is that a system for supporting communication 
may be introduced into a relatively stable structure with no 
> 
explicitly mandated change in organization structure; the 
results of the introduction of the system are dependent on the 
adequacy of the existing structure and team members' needs for 
alternative ways to accomplish their tasks. For example, an @ 
electronic mail system may be provided as a bonus by the vendor 
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of an MIS package, and the use of the extra feature (e. g. , for 
lateral communication) may even run counter to the existing 
hierarchical structure. The use of the system, then, if at all, 
would be largely informal for at least a period of time. Thus, 
the system will have an impact on the organization, but the 
changes will go largely unnoticed and informal modes of 
communication will coexist with more traditional, hierarchical 
routines. 
SAMPLE CASES 
In order to illustrate the analytical use of transaction cost 
theory, we now discuss some cases of introduction and/or use of 
information technology to support coordination. These cases are 
also meant to illustrate the variety of possible outcomes of 
introduction of such systems. All but the last of the cases are 
based on our own empirical investigations. 
The Hidden Network 
Several years ago, the R&D Department of a European computer 
manufacturer was assigned the task of developing the proprietary 
operating system of a new computer line. To increase productivity 
and improve the organization of work, two major innovations were 
introduced. The first was a structured methodology for 
streamlining software development; i.e., a set of guidelines to 
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organize work into stages, define goals and activities for each 
stage, etc. The second was a 'software factory'; i.e., a computer 
1 
network connecting hundreds of workstations on which software to 
1 
support programming tasks could be run. 
The first innovation, the structured methodology, failed. Its 
purpose was to standardize interfaces between execution of 
subtasks. From an organizational perspective, the structured 
methodology would have reinforced the existing hierarchical 
division of labor for systems development. Its use required 
adoption by all development personnel, who did not see it as 
helping them do their work more effectively. 
Once the software factory was introduced, however, it became the 
basic infrastructure for the daily work of hundreds of 
programmers. Much of the coordination of work took place via the 
, 
electronic mail and software tools. The messaging system provided 
an informal channel for direct communication between programmers 
and allowed the integration of different pieces of code; the 
network supported large work groups, so that the real tasks, 
roles, and communication lines were no longer governed by the 
formal structure. The real organization was the product of 
informal cooperation and bargaining taking place through the 
network. Interestingly enough, however, all the agents seemed to 
ignore the emergent work organization and to operate as if the 
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formal hierarchical structure were still operational (Ciborra & 
Lanzara, 1987) . 
Implications: In this case, the existing hierarchical structure 
was inadequate to the immediate coordination needs of the members 
of the work group. These were characterized by high uncertainty 
of the task of developing a complex software product. The group 
did not adopt a system designed to simplify coordination, but 
they did adopt that part of it to facilitate greater sharing of 
information. However, the part of the system that was adopted was 
not explicitly consistent with the existing organizational 
structure. Thus the network impacted transaction costs within 
the hierarchy by creating lateral channels of communication. 
This fact not being acknowledged resulted in slack; i.e., a 
"pasted-up" and redundant set of coordination modes. 
Creatins a Wired Alliance 
Apple Computers and Benetton are two companies operating 
worldwide in different markets, with their homes in completely 
different contexts, the former in Silicon Valley, the latter in 
the province of Venice, Italy, Yet there are striking features 
in common. They are both innovative and young companies; they owe 
their success to brilliant initial ideas about the product and 
its distribution and to unorthodox management approaches. The 
visions and charismatic leadership of the owners have been an 
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important cultural trait of both companies. In both companies the 
management structure was established only after their staggering 
expansion. Finally, they both emphasize a flat organization with 
wide distribution of authority and information sharing at all 
levels. 
SAFA is the joint venture of the two companies in the financial 
services sector. SAFA is a "wired alliancew in the sense that it 
sells financial services, such as leasing contracts, loans, and 
insurance contracts, through Applelink, the dedicated network 
that connects Apple personnel worldwide (and specifically the 
Apple shops in Italy). In each shop where a customer enters to 
buy a personal computer, peripherals, networks, and software the 
salesperson can sit down with the customer at a terminal, present 
the financial services available, and actually fill out all the 
forms needed. At the other end of the network, Benetton provides 
the actual services. In this way the financial services division 
of Benetton through Applelink has access to the new market of 
personal computer buyers. 
Implications: In this case, a network serves as the 
infrastructure for the joint venture of the two companies, 
reducing transaction costs in the chain linking the final 
customer to the financial services supplier. Thus we can speak 
of a network used for the purpose of supporting an electronic 
market between the two companies and the customer (Malone et all 
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1987). while it is not an example of work group support per se, 
it does illustrate the use of networks to reduce transaction 
(i.e., communication) costs in a market-like arrangement. 
An Electronic Clan 
A well-known West Coast research laboratory created an 
"experiment" to help them understand coordination requirements of 
a work group when face-to-face coordination was not possible. 
They created a "neww subgroup 400 miles away from the original 
laboratory. Within any given project , goals, deadlines, and 
subtasks were only very loosely defined and constantly changing 
based on new discoveries in the process of research. 
A particularly difficult problem was instilling in group members, 
especially new ones, a sense of what were the most appropriate 
projects to work on and how to spend their time. Modes of 
appropriate behavior needed to be provided and reinforced across 
a distance. Therefore, the tools the group migrated toward were 
video-based; they established an interactive audio and video 
link between the two sites. In essence they tried to broaden the 
communications channel between the two sites as much as they 
could, so that all kinds of information, much of it behavioral 
cues rather than specific requests or commitments, could be 
transmitted. There was little demand for more structured 
coordination tools such as project management systems, which 
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would standardize or simplify coordination requirements, since 
requirements were constantly changing. 
Implications: This organization has high task uncertainty, 
because projects and directions are constantly redefined through 
discovery. It also has relatively high goal congruence, and 
typically in this type of organization, attention needs to be 
constantly paid to maintaining that congruence and maintaining a 
clan-like structure. Thus the system tools chosen to keep the 
two sites in congruence may generate slack (they are often 
underutilized and are expensive), but support the organization's 
existing needs in terms of maintaining a communications 
infrastructure which is rich in behavioral cues. 
Copins with Uncertainty and Complexity 
A leading East Coast computer manufacturer is well known for its 
highly matrixed, fluid, organizational structure. The information 
technology most commonly utilized to support the organization is 
electronic mail, which facilitates lateral communication within 
and between organizational units. There are few systems, such as 
traditional management reporting systems, utilized to reinforce 
vertical hierarchical authority. 
The organization utilizes multiple channels for meeting 
coordination requirements: electronic mail, computer 
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conferencing, etc. However, it also still relies heavily on face- % 
? 
to-face meetings and persuasion. The coordination tools 
utilized, while rudimentary, have been an accepted method of 
doing business for a long time. The organization also exists in 
an environment which, while constantly in flux, always provides a 
high degree of task uncertainty. Furthermore, goal congruence 
is ephemeral; very high level goals are accepted but the ways 
they should be translated into operational strategies are hotly 
contested. Thus there is a constant set of negotiations between 
groups within the firm (e.g., between marketing and engineering). 
The organization acts as a loosely defined hierarchy with heavy 
emphasis on lateral channels of communication; electronic mail, 
computer conferencing, etc, facilitate lateral communication and 
are highly critical to daily operations. 
Implications: This organization operates as a clan-like 
structure, with significant overhead (transaction costs) involved 
in maintaining goal congruence of organization members. 
Electronic messaging to support lateral communications within and 
between groups is essential to its operation. It is, in a sense, 
* 
a "networked organizationw whose telecommunications networks 
, 
reflect its complex, matrixed organization structure. 
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An ~lectronic Hierarchy 
'I 
Mrs. Fieldst Cookies is a well publicized case of the use of 
information technology to support a unique organizational k 
structure. The company has experienced rapid growth, going from 
one to 500 stores, all wholly-owned, in three years. The company 
has essentially a two-layer hierarchy with centralized control; 
each store coordinates extensively with headquarters, and there 
is little or no lateral communication between stores. The j 
company uses information technology heavily to maintain 
centralized control. The systems have two important 
characteristics: if a machine can do a task it should do a task, 
and there should be a single centralized database. Thus each 
store has a personal computer with a limited database of store 
records; each computer is directly linked with the headquarters 
computer. Headquarters monitors store production and sales 
hourly, dictates batch size, and orders ingredients centrally. 
But other features, particularly voice mail and electronic mail, 
bring the stores into closer contact with the CEO for issues that 
are not in the database. Thus the network helps to accomplish 
two things: "It gives top management a dimension of personal 
control over dispersed operations that small companies otherwise 
find impossible to achieve. It projects a founder's vision into 
parts of a company that have long ago outgrown his or her ability 
to reach in person." (Richman, 1987). 
Center for Digital Economy Research 
Stem School of Business 
IVorking Paper IS-88-65 
Implications: This is an example of explicit use of information 
technology to design a certain organizational structure. 
Although task uncertainty is relatively low, a hierarchical 
structure is preferred by the owners to a market-like 
arrangement. They utilize information technology explicitly to 
support a very flat structure with centralized control. In 
addition, they recognize the need for a degree of goal congruence 
and fully utilize current communications technology to reinforce 
that. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The transaction cost approach allows an economic understanding of 
the nature and dynamics of work groups under the influence of 
competitive forces. The framework also has predictive value in 
anticipating the possible impacts of computer-based systems that 
support various forms of work groups (market-like, hierarchical, 
and clan-like). To be sure, the cases have shown that there is 
not a direct, deterministic link between the use of a computer- 
based system and the arrangement of the team that uses the 
system. The actual impacts are instead the outcome of the 
interaction between the characteristics of the technology, the 
pre-existing organization, environmental pressures, and the 
choices group members and the surrounding organization make, 
Moreover, even initial plans and designs can be turned upside- 
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down if the technology has some side effects which were not 
initially anticipated. 
Im~lications for System Desisn 
The transaction cost approach allows some normative statements 
regarding the design of systems to support work groups. First, 
one should not take a team as a stable set of social practices. 
i 
In order to work as a team, members continuously solve the 
8 
structural problems of coordination and control and manage to 
work out the subtleties of staying together. The complexity of 
1 
such problem-solving depends on the communication structure, the s 
level of trust, the ambiguity of the goals and tasks, and the 
external pressures the team has to face. In an economic context, q 
the analysis of the nature of transactions that link the members 
of a work group among themselves and with their external 
environment provides a good start in understanding the specific 
% 
solution that people give to the problem of "surviving as a 
teamw. Complexity of transactions is evaluated in terms of 
transaction costs; these are basically the costs of acquiring, 
making sense of, storing, and communicating information about I 
performance, tasks, outcomes, behaviors, etc. 
t 
Thus a system for work group support should be designed to fit t 
the nature of the transactions of the specific work group. 
Alternatively and more creatively, it could be used to transform 
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the work group. Here, the transaction cost approach would be of 
help in pointing to the possible limitations of too-ambitious 
designs or the relative efficiency of alternative socio-technical 
solutions. Thus, the approach would warn system designers of the 
limitations of setting up an electronic market in a clan, or it 
may indicate that one could substitute a hierarchy with an 
electronic market. 
Implications for Orsanization Desian 
In the broader context of organization design, transaction cost 
theory is one framework for considering how information 
technologies to support coordination affect organization 
structures themselves. In each one of the cases, information 
technology was used to facilitate coordination and information 
sharing, rather than to simplify tasks or standardize 
communication as more traditional management information systems 
do (Galbraith,l977). We conclude that the technologies designed 
to support work groups also facilitate organization structures 
that would be inefficient or ineffective without the technology. 
In one firm, a highly fluid matrix structure is maintained 
through a telecommunications network and electronic messaging. 
In another, centralized control is maintained over a very wide 
span. In a third, an alliance between firms is established and 
maintained efficiently. 
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Transaction cost theory defines two dimensions which determine 
appropriate organization design: task uncertainty and goal 
congruence. Our sample cases show how information technology 
expands the range of organization design alternatives around 
these two dimensions. 
Thus work group support is a reflection of organization design 
and vice versa. Work groups of the future will look different: 
they will not be constrained by space and time in their ability 
to coordinate and be productive. Organizations will reflect the 
same removal of constraints: the llnetworked organizationB1 of the 
future may be more centralized, or more matrixed, or more 
characterized by inter-organizational linkages than the 
traditional hierarchy of today. 
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